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Abstract In multiagent systems, agents often have to rely on other agents
to reach their goals, for example when they lack a needed resource or do not
have the capability to perform a required action. Agents therefore need to
cooperate. Then, some of the questions raised are: Which agent(s) to cooper-
ate with? What are the potential coalitions in which agents can achieve their
goals? As the number of possibilities is potentially quite large, how to auto-
mate the process? And then, how to select the most appropriate coalition,
taking into account the uncertainty in the agents’ abilities to carry out certain
tasks? In this article, we address the question of how to find and evaluate
coalitions among agents in multiagent systems using MCS tools, while taking
into consideration the uncertainty around the agents’ actions. Our methodol-
ogy is the following: We first compute the solution space for the formation of
coalitions using a contextual reasoning approach. Second, we model agents as
contexts in Multi-Context Systems (MCS), and dependence relations among
agents seeking to achieve their goals, as bridge rules. Third, we systematically
compute all potential coalitions using algorithms for MCS equilibria, and given
a set of functional and non-functional requirements, we propose ways to select
the best solutions. Finally, in order to handle the uncertainty in the agents’
actions, we extend our approach with features of possibilistic reasoning. We
illustrate our approach with an example from robotics.
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1 Introduction
In multiagent systems, agents have goals to satisfy. Typically, agents cannot
reach all their goals by themselves, without any help. Instead, agents need to
cooperate with other agents, for example because they need a specific resource
to satisfy a goal, or do not have the capability required to perform a task.
Moreover, in most real-world settings, we cannot always be certain that agents
will carry out their assigned tasks successfully.
The questions then, are: Which agent to cooperate with? Which group
of agents to join? The problem of assembling a group of cooperating agents
in order for all agents to reach their goals, shared or not, is referred to as
coalition formation, and has been on the focus of many recent studies in the
area of multiagent systems (e.g., [57,58,55,37,8,32,16]). This paper introduces
a novel contextual reasoning approach to address the problem based on the
use of Multi-Context Systems (MCS).
Multi-Context Systems (MCS ) [31,30,12] are logical formalizations of dis-
tributed context theories connected through a set of bridge rules, which enable
information flow between different contexts. A context can be thought of as a
logical theory - a set of axioms and inference rules - that models the knowledge
of an agent. Intuitively, MCS can be used to represent any information system
that consists of heterogeneous knowledge-based agents including peer-to-peer
systems, distributed ontologies or Ambient Intelligence systems. Several ap-
plications have already been developed on top of MCS or other similar formal
models of context including (a) the CYC common sense knowledge base [42],
(b) contextualized ontology languages, such as Distributed Description Logics
[10] and C-OWL [11], (c) context-based agent architectures [48,50], and (d)
distributed reasoning algorithms for Mobile Social Networks [4] and Ambient
Intelligence systems [6].
In this article, we address the question of how to find and evaluate coali-
tions among agents while taking advantage of the MCS model and algorithms.
Specifically, our approach uses two variants of MCS. The first variant, called
nonmonotonic MCS [12], allows us to handle incomplete information and po-
tential conflicts that may arise when integrating information from different
sources. The second variant, called possibilistic MCS [35], is a formalism that
enables to model uncertainty in context theories and bridge rules. The main
advantages of our approach are: (a) MCS can represent heterogenous multi-
agent systems, i.e. systems containing agents with different knowledge repre-
sentation models; (b) bridge rules can represent different kinds of inter-agent
relationships such as dependencies, constraints and conflicting goals; (c) the
possibilistic extension of MCS enables modeling uncertainty in the agents’ ac-
tions; (d) there are both centralized and distributed algorithms that can be
used for computing the potential coalitions.
We formulate our main research question as:
– How to find and evaluate coalitions among agents in multiagent systems
using MCS tools while taking into consideration the uncertainty around
the agents’ actions?
This breaks down into the following three sub-questions:
1. How to formally compute the solution space for coalition formation using
the MCS model and algorithms?
2. How to select the best solution given a set of requirements?
3. How to compute and evaluate coalitions taking also into account the uncer-
tainty in the agents’ actions?
Our methodology is the following. We start with modeling dependencies
among agents using dependence relations as described in [58]. We then model
the system as a nonmonotonic MCS: each agent is modeled as a context with
a knowledge base and an underlying logic and dependence relations are mod-
eled as bridge rules. Third, we use appropriate algorithms to compute MCS
equilibria. Each equilibrium corresponds to a different coalition. Finally, given
a set of requirements, we show how to select the best solutions. The require-
ments we consider may be of two kinds. They may be domain related. For
example in robotics, power consumption is a key concern that must be care-
fully dealt with. They may also be system related. For example in multiagent
systems, the efficiency and conviviality of the system may be considered. We
then extend our approach with features of possibilistic reasoning: We extend
the definition of dependence relations with a certainty degree; we then use the
model and algorithms of possibilistic MCS to compute the potential coalitions
under uncertainty. In this case, we evaluate the different coalitions based on
the certainty degree with which each coalition achieves the different goals,
using multiple criteria decision making methods.
This article is an extended version of [7], where we presented our method-
ology for formalizing multiagent systems and computing coalitions between
agents under the perfect world assumption, i.e. actions are always carried out
with success by the agents that they have been assigned to. Here, we provide
more details about the computation of coalitions and the selection of the best
coalition in the perfect world case. We also present new results for the cases
that the perfect world assumption does not hold due to uncertainty around
the agents’ actions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents background
information on dependence networks, coalition formation, nonmonotonic MCS
and possibilistic MCS using an example from social networks. Section 3 intro-
duces our main example originated in robotics. Section 4 describes our ap-
proach in a setting without uncertainty: how we use MCS to represent agents
and their dependencies; how we systematically compute the coalitions; and
how we then select the best coalitions with respect to given requirements. Sec-
tion 5 presents the possibilistic reasoning approach, which takes into account
the uncertainty in the agents’ actions. Section 6 presents related research, and
Section 7 concludes with a summary and a perspective on future works.
2 Background
2.1 Dependence Networks and Coalition Formation
Our model for dependencies among agents in multiagent systems is based on
dependence networks. According to Conte and Sichman [60], dependence net-
works can be used to represent the pattern of relationships that exist between
agents, and more specifically, interdependencies among agents goals and ac-
tions. They can be used to study emerging social structures such as aggregates
of heterogeneous agents. They are based on a social reasoning mechanism, on
social dependence and on power [58]. Power, in this context, means the ability
to fulfill a goal. Multi-agent dependence allows one to express a wide range of
interdependent situations between agents.
A dependence network consists of a finite set or sets of actors and the re-
lation or relations between them [59]. Actors can be people or organizations.
They are linked together by goals, behaviors and exchanges such as hard cur-
rency or information. The structural similarity between dependence networks
and directed graphs is such that a dependence network can be represented as
a directed graph. Informally, the nodes in the graph represent both the agents
themselves, and the actions they have to perform to reach a goal. The directed
edges in the graph are labelled with goals, and link agents with actions.
When agents cooperate to achieve some of their goals, they form groups or
coalitions. Coalitions are topological aspects of a dependence network. They
are indicative of some kind of organization, for example, the cooperation be-
tween agents in the dependence network. The coalition is supposed to ensure
individual agents a sufficient payoff to motivate them to collaborate. In a
coalition, agents coordinate their behaviors to reach their shared or reciprocal
goals, as for example described in [52,60]. All the agents in the coalition some-
how benefit from the goals being reached. A coalition can achieve its purpose
if its members are cooperative, i.e., if they adopt the goals of the coalition in
addition to their own goals.
2.2 Multi-Context Systems
Multi-Context Systems (MCS) [31,30,12] has been the main effort to formal-
ize context and contextual reasoning in Artificial Intelligence. We use here
the definition of heterogeneous nonmonotonic MCS given in [12]. The main
idea is to allow different logics to be used in different contexts, and to model
information flow among contexts via bridge rules.
2.2.1 Formalization
According to [12], a MCS is a set of contexts, each composed of a knowledge
base with an underlying logic, and a set of bridge rules. A logic L = (KBL,
BSL, ACCL) consists of the following components:
– KBL is the set of well-formed knowledge bases of L. Each element of KBL
is a set of formulae.
– BSL is the set of possible belief sets, where the elements of a belief set is
a set of formulae.
– ACCL: KBL → 2BSL is a function describing the semantics of the logic
by assigning to each knowledge base a set of acceptable belief sets.
As shown in [12], this definition captures the semantics of many different logics
both monotonic, e.g. propositional logic, description logics and modal logics,
and nonmonotonic, e.g. default logic, circumscription, defeasible logic and logic
programs under the answer set semantics.
A bridge rule refers in its body to other contexts and can thus add infor-
mation to a context based on what is believed or disbelieved in other contexts.
Bridge rules are added to those contexts to which they potentially add new
information. Let L = (L1, . . ., Ln) be a sequence of logics. An Lk-bridge rule
r over L, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, is of the form
r =(k : s)← (c1 : p1), . . . , (cj : pj),
not(cj+1 : pj+1), . . . ,not(cm : pm).
(1)
where ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, refers to a context, pi is an element of some belief set of
Li, and k refers to the context receiving information s. We denote by hb(r)
the belief formula s in the head of r.
A MCS M = (c1, . . . , cn) is a set of contexts ci = (Li, kbi, bri), 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
where Li = (KBi, BSi, ACCi) is a logic, kbi ∈ KBi a knowledge base, and
bri a set of Li-bridge rules over (L1, . . ., Ln). For each H ⊆ {hb(r) | r ∈ bri}
it holds that kbi ∪H ∈ KBi, meaning that bridge rule heads are compatible
with knowledge bases.
A belief state of a MCS is the set of the belief sets of its contexts. Formally,
a belief state of M = (c1, . . . , cn) is a sequence S = (S1, . . . , Sn) such that
Si ∈ BSi. Intuitively, S is derived from the knowledge of each context and the
information conveyed through applicable bridge rules. A bridge rule of form
(3) is applicable in a belief state S iff for 1 ≤ i ≤ j: pi ∈ Si and for j < l ≤ m:
pl /∈ Sl.
Equilibrium semantics selects certain belief states of a MCS as acceptable.
Intuitively, an equilibrium is a belief state S = (S1, . . . , Sn) where each context
ci respects all bridge rules applicable in S and accepts Si. Formally, S =
(S1, . . . , Sn) is an equilibrium of M , iff for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
Si ∈ ACCi(kbi ∪ {hb(r) | r ∈ bri applicable in S}).
S is a grounded equilibrium of M iff for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Si is an answer set of logic
program P = kbi∪{hb(r) | r ∈ bri applicable in S}. For a definite MCS (MCS
without default negation in the bridge rules), its unique grounded equilibrium
is the collection consisting of the least (with respect to set inclusion) Herbrand
model of each context.
In a MCS, even if contexts are locally consistent, their bridge rules may
render the whole system inconsistent. This is formally described in [12] as
a lack of an equilibrium. Most methods for inconsistency resolution in MCS
are based on the following intuition: a subset of the bridge rules that cause
inconsistency must be invalidated and another subset must be unconditionally
applied, so that the entire system becomes consistent again (e.g. [24,25]).
In [15] we proposed a different method based on conviviality, a property of
multiagent systems.
Example 1 Consider a scholar social network through which software agents,
acting on behalf of students or researchers, share information about research
articles they find online. Consider three such agents, each one with its own
knowledge base and logic exchanging information about a certain article. The
three agents can be represented as contexts c1− c3 in a MCS M = {c1, c2, c3}.
The knowledge bases of the three contexts are respectively:
kb1 =
{
sensors←, corba←,
distributedComputing ← corba, not centralizedComputing
}
kb2 ={profA}
kb3 ={ubiquitousComputing ⊆ ambientComputing}
kb1 is a logic program stating that the article is about sensors and corba, and
that articles about corba that are not classified in centralizedComputing can
be classified in distributedComputing. kb2 states in propositional logic that the
article is written by profA. kb3 is an ontology about computing written in
a basic description logic, according to which ubiquitousComputing is a type
of ambientComputing. The three agents use bridge rules r1-r4 to exchange
information about articles.
r1 =(c1 : centralizedComputing)← (c2 : middleware)
r2 =(c1 : distributedComputing)← (c3 : ambientComputing)
r3 =(c2 : middleware)← (c1 : corba)
r4 =(c3 : ubiquitousComputing)← (c1 : sensors), (c2 : profB)
With r1 and r2, the first agent classifies articles about middleware (as de-
scribed in c2) in the category of centralizedComputing, and articles about am-
bientComputing (as described in c3) in distributedComputing. With r3, the
second agent classifies articles about corba in middleware. Finally, with r4, the
third agent classifies articles about sensors, which have been written by profB,
in ubiquitousComputing. M has one equilibrium:
S =
( {sensors, corba, centralizedComputing},
{profA,middleware}, ∅
)
according to which, the first agent classifies the paper in centralizedComputing,
and the second agent classifies it in middleware.
Consider now the case that profB is identified by c2 as a second author of
the paper:
kb2 = {profA, profB}
Rules r4 and r2 would then become applicable, and as a result M would not
have an equilibrium; it would therefore be inconsistent. To resolve the conflict,
one of the four bridge rules r1-r4 would have to be invalidated. For example,
by invalidating rule r1, the system would have one equilibrium:
S1 =
 {sensors, corba, distributedComputing},{profA, profB,middleware},
{ubiquitousComputing, ambientComputing}

2.2.2 Computational Complexity
Paper [12] presents an analysis on computational complexity, focusing on MCS
with logics that have poly-size kernels. A logic L has poly-size kernels, if there
is a mapping κ, which assigns to every kb ∈ KB and S ∈ ACC(kb) a set
κ(kb, S) ⊆ S of size (written as a string) polynomial in the size of kb, called the
kernel of S, such that there is a one-to-one correspondence f between the belief
sets in ACC(kb) and their kernels, i.e., S 
 f(κ(kb, S)). Examples of logics
with poly-size kernels include propositional logic, default logic, autoepistemic
logic and nonmonotonic logic programs. If furthermore, given any knowledge
base kb, an element b, and a set of elements K, deciding whether (i) K =
κ(kb, S) for some S ∈ ACC(kb) and (ii) b ∈ S is in ∆pk, then we say that L
has kernel reasoning in ∆pk. For example, default logic and autoepistemic logic
have kernel reasoning in ∆p2.
According to the analysis in [12], for a finite MCS M (where all knowledge
bases kbi and sets of bridge rules bri are finite, and the logics Li are from an
arbitrary but fixed set), where all logics Li have poly-size kernels and kernel
reasoning in ∆pk, deciding whether a literal p is in a belief set Si for some (or
each) equilibrium of M is in Σpk+1 (resp. Π
p
k+1 = co−Σpk+1).
2.3 Possibilistic reasoning in MCS
Recently, Yin et al. proposed a framework for possibilistic reasoning in Multi-
Context Systems, which they called possibilistic MCS [35]. This has been so far
the only attempt to model uncertainty in MCS. It is based on possibilistic logic
[23] and possibilistic logic programs [46], which are logic-based frameworks for
representing states of partial ignorance using a dual pair of possibility and
necessity measures. These frameworks are in turn based on ideas from Zadeh’s
possibility theory [68]. Below, we first provide some preliminary information
on possibilistic logic programs, which will then help us to present possibilistic
MCS.
2.3.1 Possibilistic Logic Programs [46]
Possibilistic logic and logic programs use the notion of possibilistic concept,
which is denoted by X, where X denotes its classical counterpart. For ex-
ample, in possibilistic logic programs, this notion is used in the definitions of
possibilistic atoms and poss-programs:
Definition 1 Let Σ be a finite set of atoms. A possibilistic atom is p =
(p, [α]), where p ∈ Σ and α ∈ [0, 1].
The classical projection of p is the atom p and n(p) = α is called the
necessity degree of p.
Definition 2 A possibilistic normal logic program (or poss-program) p is a
set of possibilistic rules of the form:
r = s← p1, . . . , pm, not q1, . . . , not qn, [α]. (2)
where m,n ≥ 0, {p1, . . . , pm, q1, . . . , qn, s} ⊆ Σ, and n(r) = α ∈ [0, 1].
In (2), α represents the certainty level of the information described by rule
r. The head of r is defined as head(r) = s and its body as body(r) = body+(r)∪
not body−(r), where body+(r) = {p1, . . . , pm} and body−(r) = {q1, . . . , qn}.
The positive projection of r is
r+ = head(r)← body+(r), [α] (3)
The classical projection of r is the classical rule:
r = s← p1, . . . , pm, not q1, . . . , not qn (4)
If a poss-program p does not contain any default negation then p is called
a definite poss-program. The reduct of a poss-program p w.r.t. a set of atoms
T is the definite poss-program defined as:
pT = {r+ | r ∈ p, body−(r) ∩ T = ∅} (5)
For a set of atoms T ⊆ Σ and a rule r ∈ p, we say that r is applicable in
T if body+(r) ⊆ T and body−(r)∩T = ∅. App(p, T ) denotes the set of rules in
p that are applicable in T .
P is said to be grounded if it can be ordered as a sequence 〈r1, . . . , rn〉 such
that
∀i, 1 ≥ i ≥ n, ri ∈ App(p, head({r1, . . . , ri−1})) (6)
Given a poss-program p over a set of atoms Σ, the semantics of p is defined
through possibility distributions on Σ.1
1 For more details about the semantics of poss-programs, see [46].
2.3.2 Possibilistic MCS [35]
A possibilistic MCS (or poss-MCS ) is a collection of possibilistic contexts. A
possibilistic context c is a triple (Σ,P ,B) where Σ is a set of atoms, P is a
poss-program, and B is a set of possibilistic bridge rules. A possibilistic bridge
rule is defined as follows:
Definition 3 Let k, c1, . . . , cn be possibilistic contexts. A possibilistic bridge
rule pr for context k is of the form
pr =(k : s)← (c1 : p1), . . . , (cj : pj),
not(cj+1 : pj+1), . . . ,not(cm : pm), [α]
(7)
where s is an atom in k and each pi is an atom in context ci. 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Intuitively, a rule of form (7) states that information s is added to context
k with necessity degree α if, for 1 ≥ i ≥ j, pi is provable in context ci and for
j + 1 ≥ l ≥ n, pl is not provable in cl.
By pr (see equation (3)) we denote the classical projection of pr. The
necessity degree of pr is denoted by n(pr).
Definition 4 A possibilistic Multi-Context System, or just poss-MCS, M =
(c1, . . . , cn) is a collection of possibilistic contexts ci = (Σi, Pi, Bi), 1 ≥ i ≥ n,
where each Σi is the set of atoms used in context ci, Pi is a poss-program on
Σi and Bi is a set of possibilistic bridge rules over atom sets (Σi, . . . , Σn).
A poss-MCS is definite if the poss-program and possibilistic bridge rules
of each context are definite.
Definition 5 A possibilistic belief state, S = (S1, . . . , Sn) is a collection of
possibilistic atom sets Si, where each Si is a collection of possibilistic atoms
pi and pi ∈ Σi.
We will now describe the semantics for poss-MCS, starting with definite
poss-MCS. The following definition specifies the possibility distribution of be-
lief states for a given definite poss-MCS. It uses the notion of satisfiability of
a rule r, which is based on its applicability w.r.t. a belief state S:
S 6|= r iff body+(r) ⊆ S and head(r) 6∈ S (8)
Definition 6 LetM = (c1, . . . , cn) be a definite poss-MCS and S = (S1, . . . , Sn)
a belief state. The possibility distribution piM : 2
Σ → [0, 1] for M is defined
as:
piM (S) =

0, if S 6⊆ head(⋃
i
Appi(M,S))
0, if
⋃
i
Appi(M,S) is not grounded
1, if S is an equilibrium of M
1−max{n(r) | S 6|= r, r ∈ Bi ∪ Li}, otherwise
(9)
The possibility distribution specifies the degree of compatibility of each
belief set S with the poss-MCS M . Based on definition 6 we can now define
the possibility and necessity of an atom is a belief state S.
Definition 7 Let M be a definite poss-MCS and piM be the possibilistic dis-
tribution for M . The possibility and necessity of an atom pi in a belief state
S are respectively defined as:
ΠM (pi) = max{piM (S) | pi ∈ Si} (10)
NM (pi) = 1−max{piM (S) | pi 6∈ Si} (11)
ΠM (pi) represents the level of consistency of pi w.r.t. the poss-MCS M ,
while NM (pi) represents the level at which pi can be inferred from M . For
example, whenever an atom pi belongs to the equilibrium of M (the classical
projection of M), its possibility is equal to 1.
The semantics for definite poss-MCS is determined by its unique possibilis-
tic grounded equilibrium.
Definition 8 Let M be a definite poss-MCS. Then the following set of pos-
sibilistic atoms is referred to as the possibilistic grounded equilibrium:
MD(M) = {S1, . . . , Sn} (12)
where Si = {(pi, NM (pi)) | pi ∈ Σi, NM (pi) > 0} for i = 1, . . . , n.
As proved in [35] (Proposition 5), the classical projection of MD(M) is
the grounded equilibrium of M , where M is the classical projection of M .
The definition of the semantics for normal poss-MCS is based on the notion
of reduct for normal poss-MCS, which is in turn based on the definition of rule
reduct (see equation (5)):
Definition 9 LetM = (c1, . . . , cn) be a normal poss-MCS and S = (S1, . . . , Sn)
a belief state. The possibilistic reduct of M w.r.t. S is the poss-MCS
M
S
= (c1
S , . . . , cnS) (13)
where ci
S = (Σi, Pi
S
, Bi
S
).
Note that the reduct of Pi relies only on Si while the reduct of Bi depends
on the whole belief state S.
Given the notion of reduct for normal poss-MCS, the equilibrium semantics
of normal poss-MCS is defined as follows:
Definition 10 Let M be a normal poss-MCS and S a possibilistic belief state.
S is a possibilistic equilibrium of M if S = MD(MS).
Paper [35] presents also a fixpoint theory for definite poss-MCS, which
provides a way for computing the equilibrium for both definite and normal
poss-MCS.
Example 2 In a different version of example 1 all agents use possibilistic logic
programs to encode their knowledge and bridge rules, forming a possibilistic
MCS M . The three agents are modelled as contexts c1, c2 and c3, respectively,
with knowledge bases:
P1 =
{
sensors←, [1], corba←, [1],
distributedComputing ← corba, not centralizedComputing, [0.8]
}
P2 ={profA, [1]}
P3 ={ambientComputing ← ubiquitousComputing, [0.9]}
and bridge rules:
B1 =
{
(c1 : centralizedComputing)← (c2 : middleware), [0.7],
(c1 : distributedComputing)← (c3 : ambientComputing), [0.6]
}
B2 ={(c2 : middleware)← (c1 : corba), [0.9]}
B3 ={(c3 : ubiquitousComputing)← (c1 : sensors), (c2 : profB), [0.8]}
Rules or facts with degree [1] indicate that the agent is certain about them,
while rules with degree less than [1] indicate uncertainty about whether the
rule holds.
M is a normal poss-MCS. In order to compute its possibilistic equilibrium,
we first have to compute its reduct with respect to S, where S is the grounded
equilibrium of M (the classical projection of M):
S =
( {sensors, corba, centralizedComputing},
{profA,middleware}, ∅
)
The reduct of M with respect to S, MS , is derived from M by replacing P1
with P1
S
:
P1
S
= {sensors, [1], corba, [1], distributedComputing ← corba, [0.8]}
The next step is to compute the necessity of each atom in S. Following Defi-
nition 6, piM (S) = 1, as S is the grounded equilibrium of M . For
S ′ = ({sensors, corba}, {profA,middleware}, ∅)
it holds that piM (S ′) = 1−max{0.8, 0.7} = 0.2, while for
S ′′ = ({sensors, corba}, {profA}, ∅)
it holds that piM (S ′′) = 1 − max{0.8, 0.7, 0.9} = 0.1. Using Definition 7,
the necessities of the atoms in S are: ΠM (sensors) = 1, ΠM (cobra) = 1,
ΠM (centralizedComputing) = 0.8, ΠM (profA) = 1 and ΠM (middleware) =
0.9. The possibilistic equilibrium of M is therefore:
S =
( {(sensors, [1]), (corba, [1])(, centralizedComputing, [0.8])},
{(profA, [1]), (middleware, [0.9])}, ∅
)
3 Main Example
We now present a scenario to illustrate how our approach works. Consider
an office building, where robots assist human workers. As typically, there are
not enough office supplies, such as cutters, glue, etc., for everyone, they have
to be shared among the workers. Furthermore, as it is considered inefficient
and unproductive for a worker to contact other colleagues and get supplies by
themselves, the workers can submit requests to the robots to get and/or deliver
the needed supplies for them, while they keep on working at their desks. We
refer to a request submitted to the robots as a task.
Workers and robots communicate via a simple web-based application, which
transmits the workers’ requests to the robots and keeps track of their status.
The robots have limited computational resources: they only keep track of their
recent past. Furthermore, not all robots know about the exact locations of sup-
plies. Therefore, robots rely on each other for information about the location
of the supplies: the last robot having dealt with a supply is the one knowing
where it is. We assume the availability of such an application, and a stable
and reliable communication network. A depiction of the scenario is presented
in Figure 1.
Fig. 1 A depicted scenario of robots in office building.
We consider a set of four robots Ag = {ag1, ag2, ag3, ag4} and four tasks:
T = {t1, t2, t3, t4}, where t1 is to deliver a pen to desk Da, t2 is to deliver a
piece of paper to desk Da, t3 is to deliver a tube of glue to desk Db, and t4 is
to deliver a cutter to desk Db. We assume that a robot can perform a task if
it can carry the relevant material and knows its source and destination. Due
to their functionalities, robots can carry the following material: ag1 the pen
or the glue, ag2 the paper, ag3 the glue or the cutter, and ag4 the pen or the
cutter. Each robot knows who has the information about the source and the
destination of each material, but the actual coordinates are only revealed after
an agreement on a coalition among the robots has been made. This involves
interdependency among robots.
To start, robots get the information concerning the locations of the supplies
and the distances between the material and their destinations. Tables 1 and 2
present the knowledge of the robots about the tasks and the current distances
among the robots, the material and the destinations, respectively. The table
should be read as follows. Robot ag1, regarding task t1, knows nothing about
the source of the pen, i.e., where it currently is, but does know the destination
for the pen, i.e., where it must be delivered. Regarding task t2, robot ag1
knows where the paper is, but knows nothing about its destination.
Table 1 Robots’ knowledge and capabilities
Robot ag1 ag2
Task t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4
Source x x
Destination x x x
Robot ag3 ag4
Task t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4
Source x x
Destination x
Table 2 Distances among locations
Distances among locations
Robot Pen Paper Glue Cutter
ag1 10 15 9 12
ag2 14 8 11 13
ag3 12 14 10 7
ag4 9 12 15 11
Destination Pen Paper Glue Cutter
Da 11 16 9 8
Db 14 7 12 9
Upon receiving information about the tasks, robots generate plans to carry
out the tasks based on their knowledge and capabilities. For example, there
are two different plans for delivering the pen to desk Da (t1): ag1 can deliver
it after receiving information about its location from robot ag2; alternatively,
ag4 can deliver it after receiving information about its location from ag2 and
about its destination from ag1. Given the plans, the robots then need to decide
how to form coalitions to execute the tasks. We refer to a coalition as a group
of robots executing a task. For example to accomplish all tasks t1, t2, t3, t4, the
following two coalitions may be formed:
C0 :={(ag1, t3), (ag2, t2), (ag3, t4), (ag4, t1)}
C1 :={(ag1, t1), (ag2, t2), (ag3, t3), (ag4, t4)}
After forming coalitions, each robot has to generate its own plan to carry out
the assigned tasks, e.g. plan the optimal route to get the material and carry
it to its destination.
Typically, route planning programs split into two main parts, the repre-
sentation of the environment and a method of searching possible route paths
between the current robot position and some new location, avoiding the ob-
stacles which are known. Hence, mobile robot navigation planning requires to
have sufficient reliable estimation of the current location of the robot, and also
a precise map of the navigation space. Path planning takes into consideration
a model or a map of the environment or contexts, to determine what are the
geometric path points for the mobile robots to track from a start position to
the goal to be reached.
The most commonly used algorithms for these methods are the A∗ algo-
rithm, a global search algorithm giving a complete and optimal global path in
static environments, and its optimization the D∗ algorithm. Other examples
in the literature include using distributed route planning methods for multiple
mobile robots, using the Lagrangian decomposition technique, neural networks
[63] and genetic algorithms [13]. One of the lessons which has been learned in
this research area is that the need for optimal planning is outweighed by the
need for quickly finding an appropriate plan [38].
In this paper our focus is on finding and selecting among the possible
coalitions with which a given set of goals will be reached, rather than on the
individual plans of the agents to carry out their assigned tasks.
4 Computing and evaluating coalitions in a perfect world
One question that arises in scenarios such as the one that we present in Section
3 is how to compute the alternative coalitions that may be formed to achieve
a set of given goals. Here we present a solution based on the use of heteroge-
neous nonmonotonic MCS [12], described in Section 2. The main reasons for
choosing the MCS model are: (a) it enables representing systems consisting
of agents with different knowledge representation models; (b) it can represent
different kinds of relationships among agents such as goal-based dependencies,
constraints and conflicting goals; and (c) it provides both centralized and dis-
tributed reasoning algorithms, which can be used for computing goal-based
coalitions. Roughly, our solution consists in representing agent dependencies
and inter-agent constraints using bridge rules and computing the potential
coalitions using algorithms for MCS equilibria.
4.1 Modeling dependencies
We model each agent in a multiagent system as a context in a MCS. The
knowledge base of the context describes the goals of the agent and the actions
that it can perform. Goals and actions are represented as literals of the form
gk, aj , respectively. Bridge rules represent the dependencies of the agent on
other agents to achieve its goals. According to the definition given by [60], a
dependence relation
dp : basic dep(agi, agj , gk, pl, am)
denotes that agent agi depends on agent agj to achieve goal gk, because agj
can perform action am needed in the plan pl, which achieves the goal; for
a goal gk of agent agi, which is achieved through plan pl = (ag1 : a1, ag2 :
a2, ..., agn : an), where agj : aj represents action aj performed by agent agj ,
the following dependence relations hold:
dpj : basic dep(agi, agj , gk, pl, aj), j = {1, ..., n}
We denote this set of dependencies as DP (agi, gk, pl). One way to represent
dependencies is by using rules of the form: Head ← Body, where the Head
denotes the goal of agent agi that is to be achieved (gk), and the Body describes
the actions of plan pl that will lead to the achievement of the goal. Based on
this intuition, we define bridge rules representing dependence relations among
agents as follows:
Definition 11 For an agent agi with goal gk achieved through plan pl = (ag1 :
a1, ag2 : a2, ..., agn : an), the set of dependencies DP (agi, gk, pl) is represented
by a bridge rule of the form:
(ci : gk)← (c1 : a1), (c2 : a2), ..., (cn : an) (14)
where cj , j = 1, ..., i, ..., n is the context representing agent agj .
Based on the above representation of agents as contexts, and goal-based de-
pendencies among agents as bridge rules, we represent multiagent systems as
MCS as follows.
Definition 12 A MCS M(A) corresponding to a multiagent system A is a
set of contexts ci = (Li, kbi, bri), where Li = (KBi, BSi, ACCi) is the logic
of agent agi ∈ A, kbi ∈ KBi is a knowledge base that describes the actions
that agi can perform and its goals, and bri is a set of bridge rules, a subset of
which represents the dependencies DP (agi, gk, pl) of agi on other agents in A
for all goals gk of agi and all plans pl, with which these goals can be achieved.
The main advantage of this model is that it enables agents using different
logics to describe their actions and goals, to form plans cooperatively by ex-
changing information through their bridge rules. Assuming a signature Σ, the
following are some example logics that are captured by definition 12:
– Default logic [49]: KB is the set of default theories based on Σ; BS is the
set of deductively closed sets of Σ-formulas; and ACC(kb) is the set of
kb’s extensions.
– Normal logic programs under answer-set semantics [28]: KB is the set of
normal logic programs over Σ; BS is the set of sets of atoms over Σ; and
ACC(kb) is the set of kb’s answer sets.
– Propositional logic under the closed-world assumption: KB is the set of sets
of propositional formulas over Σ; BS is the set of deductively closed sets
of propositional Σ-formulas; and ACC(kb) is the set of kb’s consequences
under the closed world assumption.
There are numerous other examples, both monotonic (e.g., description log-
ics, modal logics, temporal logics), and nonmonotonic (e.g., circumscription,
autoepistemic logic, defeasible logic).
This feature (the generality of the representation model) is particularly im-
portant in open environments, where agents are typically heterogenous with
respect to their representation and reasoning capabilities (e.g. Ambient Intel-
ligence systems).
Example 3 In our main example, introduced in Section 3, we assume that
all four robots use propositional logic. We model the four robots, ag1-ag4, as
contexts c1-c4, respectively, with the following knowledge bases:
kb1 ={a2s, a1d, a3d, a1c ∨ a3c}
kb2 ={a1s, a4d, a2c}
kb3 ={a4s, a2d, a3c ∨ a4c}
kb4 ={a3s, a1c ∨ a4c}
where aij represents the actions that a robot can perform. i stands for the
object to be delivered: 1 stands for the pen, 2 for the paper, 3 for the glue and
4 for the cutter. j stands for the kind of action that the agent can perform:
c stands for carrying the object, s stands for providing information about the
current location (source) of the object, while d stands for providing information
about the destination of the object. For example, ag1 can
– provide information about the source of the paper (a2s)
– provide information about the destination of the pen (a1d)
– provide information about the destination of the glue (a3d)
– carry the pen or the glue (a1c ∨ a3c)
We represent the four tasks that the robots are requested to perform, ti,
as goals, gi. For example g1 represents the task of delivering the pen to desk
Da (t1). We also assume that a robot agj can fulfil goal gi, i.e. deliver object i
to its destination, if it can perform action aic, i.e. carry object i. For example,
g1 can be fulfilled by robots ag1 and ag4, because these robots can carry the
pen (a1c).
Given the knowledge and capabilities of robots, as described in Table 1,
the robots can fulfil goals g1 − g4 as follows. For g1, there are two alternative
plans:
p11 =(ag2 : a1s, ag1 : a1c)
p12 =(ag2 : a1s, ag1 : a1d, ag4 : a1c)
According to p11, robot ag2 must provide information about the source of the
pen (ag2 : a1s) and ag1 must carry the pen to its destination (ag1 : a1c).
According to p12, robot ag2 must provide information about the source of the
pen (ag2 : a1s), ag1 must provide information about its destination (ag1 : a1d),
and ag4 must carry the pen to its destination (ag4 : a1c).
For g2 there is only one plan, p21; for g3 there are two alternative plans:
p31 and p32; and for g4 there are two plans: p41 and p42:
p21 =(ag1 : a2s, ag3 : a2d, ag2 : a2c)
p31 =(ag4 : a3s, ag1 : a3c)
p32 =(ag4 : a3s, ag1 : a3d, ag3 : a3c)
p41 =(ag2 : a4d, ag3 : a4c)
p42 =(ag3 : a4s, ag2 : a4d, ag4 : a4c)
Each plan implies dependencies among robots. For example, from p11 the
following dependency is derived:
dp1 : basic dep(ag1, ag2, g1, p11, a1s)
namely ag1 depends on ag2 to achieve goal g1, because ag2 can provide in-
formation about the source of the pen (a1s). Figure 2 represents the depen-
dencies derived from all plans, abstracting from plans, similarly to [58]. The
figure should be read as follows: The pair of arrows going from node ag1 to
the rectangle box labeled a1s and then to node ag2 indicates that agent ag1
depends on agent ag2 to achieve goal g1, because the latter can perform action
a1s.
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Fig. 2 Dependencies among the four robot agents.
Bridge rules r1-r7 represent the same dependencies. Each rule represents
the dependencies derived by a different plan. For example r1 corresponds to
plan p11 and represents dependency dp1.
r1 = (c1 : g1)← (c1 : a1c), (c2 : a1s)
r2 = (c4 : g1)← (c4 : a1c), (c2 : a1s), (c1 : a1d)
r3 = (c2 : g2)← (c2 : a2c), (c1 : a2s), (c3 : a2d)
r4 = (c1 : g3)← (c1 : a3c), (c4 : a3s)
r5 = (c3 : g3)← (c3 : a3c), (c4 : a3s), (c1 : a3d)
r6 = (c3 : g4)← (c3 : a4c), (c2 : a4d)
r7 = (c4 : g4)← (c4 : a4c), (c3 : a4s), (c2 : a4d)
One system constraint is that two robots cannot carry the same object at the
same time. In order to represent this constraint, we expand the body of each
of the bridge rules with a predicate that describes the fact that another robot
carries the material that the rule refers to:
r′1 = (c1 : g1)← (c1 : a1c), (c2 : a1s), not(c1 : carriesElse1)
r′2 = (c4 : g1)← (c4 : a1c), (c2 : a1s), (c1 : a1d), not(c4 : carriesElse1)
r′3 = (c2 : g2)← (c2 : a2c), (c1 : a2s), (c3 : a2d), not(c2 : carriesElse2)
r′4 = (c1 : g3)← (c1 : a3c), (c4 : a3s), not(c1 : carriesElse3)
r′5 = (c3 : g3)← (c3 : a3c), (c4 : a3s), (c1 : a3d), not(c3 : carriesElse3)
r′6 = (c3 : g4)← (c3 : a4c), (c2 : a4d), not(c3 : carriesElse3)
r′7 = (c4 : g4)← (c4 : a4c), (c3 : a4s), (c2 : a4d), not(c4 : carriesElse4)
For example c1 : carriesElse1, which appears in r
′
1, represents that an agent
different to ag1 carries material 1 (the pen).
For each of the four robots agl, and for each material i that the robot can
carry, we also add bridge rules of the form:
(cl : carriesElsei)← (ck : aic)
where i, k, l = {1...4} and k 6= l, which describe the cases that an agent
different to agl carries material i. For example, the following rules describe
the cases that a robot different to ag1 carries the pen.
r′8 = (c1 : carriesElse1)← (c2 : a1c)
r′9 = (c1 : carriesElse1)← (c3 : a1c)
r′10 = (c1 : carriesElse1)← (c4 : a1c)
We should note here that the same example can also be represented using
dynamic MCS [21], which use schematic bridge rules that are instantiated
at run time. For example, using dynamic MCS, we would replace the static
predicates (c1 : carriesElse1) in rule r
′
1 and (c4 : carriesElse1) in r
′
2 by a
dynamic predicate (cx : a1c), which would be instantiated at run time by any
context cx, which contains a1c in its knowledge base; in other words by any
robot that can carry material 1. Rules such as r′8, r
′
9 and r
′
10 would then be
unnecessary and would be omitted. Such an approach is more appropriate for
open and dynamic environments, where any agent may join or leave the system
at any time and without prior notice (e.g. Ambient Intelligence environments).
In the running example, we assumed (for reasons of simplicity) that the four
agents use propositional logic. However, with MCS it is possible to represent
any agent using a logic that can be captured by Definition 12. Note also that
we use a rather simplistic representation for plans, because our goal is not to
represent and reason with plans; we are only interested in the dependencies
derived from plans.
4.2 Computing coalitions
An equilibrium in MCS represents an acceptable belief state of the system.
Each belief set in this state is derived from the knowledge base of the cor-
responding context and is compatible with the applicable bridge rules. For
a MCS M(A) that corresponds to a multiagent system A, an equilibrium
S = {S1, ..., Sn} represents a coalition in which agents of A can achieve their
goals. Specifically, each belief set Si in the equilibrium contains the actions
that agent agi can perform and the goals that it will achieve in this coalition.
If there is more than one ways with which the goals can be achieved, the MCS
will have more than one equilibria, each one representing a different coalition.
If a certain goal does not appear in any of the equilibria, this means that there
is no coalition with which the goal can be achieved.
In order to compute the potential coalitions in a multiagent system A, one
then has to formulate the MCS M(A) that corresponds to A, and compute
the equilibria S of M(A).
Equilibria in nonmonotonic MCS can be computed using any of the fol-
lowing algorithms / implementations depending on the requirements of the
specific system or application, e.g. with respect to the representation and rea-
soning capabilities of the agents:
– The MCS-IE system [9] implements a centralized reasoning approach that
is based on the translation of MCS into HEX-programs [26] (an extension
of answer set programs with external atoms), and on their execution in the
dlv-hex system2.
– The algorithms proposed in [6] implement a distributed computation, which
however assumes that all contexts are homogeneous with respect to the
logic that they use (defeasible logic).
– The three algorithms proposed in [22] enable distributed computation of
equilibria. DMCS assumes that each agent has minimal knowledge about
the world, namely the agents that it is connected through the bridge rules,
but doesn’t have any further metadata, e.g. topological information, of the
2 http://www.kr.tuwien.ac.at/research/systems/dlvhex/
system. Its computational complexity is exponential to the number of lit-
erals used in the bridge rules. DMCS-OPT uses graph theory techniques
to detect any cycle dependencies in the system and avoid them during
the evaluation of the equilibria, improving the scalability of the evalua-
tion. DMCS-STREAMING computes the equilibria gradually (k equilibria
at a time), reducing the memory requirements for the agents. The three
algorithms have been implemented in a system prototype3.
Paper [22] presents a performance evaluation of the algorithms it proposes,
as well as a comparison with previous approaches. They conclude that the al-
gorithms in [6] are in general much faster as they are based on a low-complexity
logic, while among the others there is no clear winner, as their performance
depends on the memory capacity of the agents, and the topology of the system.
Choosing the best approach for the computation of coalitions depends on
several parameters, such as the targeted environment, the available means of
communication, the computational, communication and knowledge represen-
tation capabilities of the agents, and the specific needs and requirements of
the use cases that we want to support. For small-scale systems, such as the
one in our running example, a centralized approach, e.g. the one proposed
in [9], is probably more appropriate as it achieves better performance when
the total number of agents is small. For larger-scale systems, a distributed
scalable approach is probably more appropriate. In that case, if the main re-
quirement is to compute all possible coalitions as fast as possible, DMCS and
DMCS-OPT should be preferred; DMCS for systems with simple topology,
i.e. fewer dependencies among the agents, and DMCS-OPT for more complex
systems with possible cycle dependencies among the agents. Finally, in cases
that the memory capacity of the available agents is limited, or that we are
only interested in computing fast some (and not all) of the possible coalitions,
DMCS-STREAMING seems to be the most appropriate approach.
Example 4 Returning to our main example, the MCS that corresponds to the
system of the four robots, M(A), has two equilibria: S0 and S1:
S0 =

{a2s, a1d, a3d, a3c, g3},
{a1s, a4d, a2c, g2},
{a4s, a2d, a4c, g4},
{a3s, a1c, g1}

S1 =

{a2s, a1d, a3d, a1c, g1},
{a1s, a4d, a2c, g2},
{a4s, a2d, a3c, g3},
{a3s, a4c, g4}

S0 represents coalition C0, according to which ag1 delivers the glue to
desk Db (g3), ag2 delivers the paper to desk Da (g2), ag3 delivers the cutter to
3 http://www.kr.tuwien.ac.at/research/systems/dmcs
desk Db (g4) and ag4 delivers the pen to desk Da (g1). S1 represents coalition
C1, according to which ag1 delivers the pen to desk Da (g1), ag2 delivers the
paper to desk Da (g2), ag3 delivers the glue to desk Db (g3) and ag4 delivers
the cutter to desk Db (g4). Using the previous abstraction of plans, the two
coalitions are graphically represented in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3 Coalitions C0 (a), and C1 (b) in bold; remaining dependencies in dotted lines.
In order to achieve their goals, the robots then have to carry out the actions
in the plans that are associated to these goals. For example, for coalition C0
the associated plans are: p12 (for goal g1), p21 (for g2), p31 (for g3) and p41
(for g4), while the plans associated to C1 are p11, p21, p32 and p42.
4.3 Selecting the best coalition
Selecting the best among the possible coalitions in which agents can achieve
their goals requires evaluating and comparing them. Efficiency and stability
metrics are commonly used to evaluate coalitions (e.g., [47,54,53,39]). The
former giving an assurance on the economical gain reached by being in the
coalition, the later giving a certainty that the coalition is viable on the long
term.
Generally speaking, efficiency in a coalition is a relation between what
agents can achieve as part of the organization compared to what they can
do alone or in different coalitions. Furthermore, a coalition is economically
efficient iff i) no one can be made better off without making someone else
worse off, ii) no additional output can be obtained without increasing the
amount of inputs, iii) production proceeds at the lowest possible per-unit cost
[47].
Example 5 In our running example, we can associate efficiency to the distances
that the four robots must cover to perform the required actions. From Table
2 we can compute the distance for each robot to do each task, and, by adding
them up, the cost of executing tasks in a given coalition:
cost(C) =
4∑
i=1
dist(agi, j) + (dist(j, dest(j))
where dist(agi, j) denotes the distance between the robot (agi) and the mate-
rial (j) it has to carry in coalition C, and dist(j, dest(j)) denotes the distance
between the material (j) and its destination (dest(j)). Based on this formula,
the costs of C0 and C1 are:
cost(C0) =(9 + 12) + (8 + 16) + (7 + 9) + (9 + 11) = 81
cost(C1) =(10 + 11) + (8 + 16) + (10 + 12) + (11 + 9) = 87
If we compare C0 and C1, C0 is more economically efficient as at least
one agent is better off without making anyone worse off, all else being equal
(the distance that ag3 has to cover is 16 in C0 and 22 in C1, while all other
robots have to cover the same distance in both coalitions). C0 is also more
cost efficient than C1, as its overall cost is smaller.
Other approaches could take into consideration the time it takes for each
robot to accomplish its task and select the best coalition, which would in
this case, be the one which executes the fastest all its tasks. To do this we
would simply include a table of task duration for each robot along with the
distances and compute the times similarly as for previously done for the dis-
tances. Moreover, other variables could be included such as the resources being
actually used by each robot to accomplish its task, and the potential obstacle
to avoid in order to reach their goals.
Stability of coalitions is related to the potential gain in staying in the
coalition or quitting the coalition for more profit (i.e., free riding). Hence,
several elements come to play for the evaluation of a coalition’s stability. First,
the coalition outcome should be greater than the individual ones cumulated.
This is usually computed via a characteristic function such as the one proposed
in [44]. Second, the distribution of benefits should be fair. Several functions,
named sharing rules have been proposed for this purpose, such as the Shapley
value [54], nucleolus [53] and Satisfactory Nucleolus [39]. The leading idea is to
take the individual contribution and the free rider’s value into account when
sharing the benefits.
Depending on the application domain, other functional and non-functional
requirements, e.g., security, user-friendliness or conviviality, may also play an
important role in the choice of a coalition. In [14], we compared coalitions
in terms of conviviality. Defined by Illich as “individual freedom realized in
personal interdependence” [34], conviviality was introduced as a social science
concept for multiagent systems to highlight soft qualitative requirements like
user friendliness of systems. In [14], we proposed measures for conviviality
to evaluate coalitions in dependence networks based on the following rough
idea: more opportunities to work with others increases the system’s convivial-
ity. Specifically, we measured conviviality by the number of reciprocity-based
coalitions that can be formed within an overall coalition. In our measures we
used the notion of cycles in the dependence graph, which denote the smallest
graph topology expressing interdependence, and therefore conviviality. Given
the dependence network (DN) that corresponds to a given coalition, the con-
viviality of the coalition conv(DN) can be computed as follows:
conv(DN) =
∑
coal(a, b)
Ω
, (15)
Ω = |A|(|A| − 1)×Θ, (16)
Θ =
l=|A|∑
l=2
Perm(|A| − 2, l − 2)× |G|l, (17)
where |A| is the number of agents in the system, |G| is the number of goals,
Perm is the usual permutation defined in combinatorics, coal(a, b) for any
distinct pair of agents a, b ∈ A is the number of cycles that contain the ordered
pair (a, b) in DN , l is the cycle length, and Ω denotes the maximal number of
pairs of agents in cycles.
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Fig. 4 Goal dependencies in coalitions C0 (a), and C1 (b).
Example 6 Back to our running example, abstracting from plans and actions,
Figures 4.a and 4.b represent the dependence networks for coalitions C0 and
C1 respectively. For both dependence networks, by applying formulae 16 and
17, we get Θ = 656 and Ω = 7872. By applying formula 15, we can then
compute the conviviality of the two coalitions:
conv(C0) = 0.00089, conv(C1) = 0.00127
Based on the above, C1 is therefore preferred to C0 in terms of conviviality.
In cases of agents with conflicting goals, coalitions differ in the set of goals
that they can fulfil and the selection of a coalition depends on the priorities
among the conflicting goals. It is among our future plans to integrate in the
proposed model a preference relation on the set of goals to represent such
priorities and develop algorithms for preference-based coalition formation.
The problem of selecting the best coalition however, has also been seen
as tied to finding the optimal coalition structure, and therefore as a search
problem which consists in performing a search on the coalition structure graph
[51]. A search through a subset of the coalition structure space is required: first,
the bottom two levels of the coalition structure graph, then a time bounded
breadth first search from the top of the coalition structure graph. The best
coalition structure that is found is selected. This was optimised by [20], who
analysed fewer coalitions to establish small bounds from the optimal. In [55],
coalition sizes are limited and a greedy heuristic to yield a coalition structure
is used; i.e. based on a limited number of agents.
5 Computing coalitions under uncertainty
The models for representing and computing coalitions that we presented in
Section 4 are based on the perfect world assumption, according to which it
is always certain that agents will carry out the actions that are specified in
the associated plans. However, in real-world settings, such assumption is not
always valid. For instance, in our running example, there is uncertainty asso-
ciated to the robots carrying the materials to their destinations. A robot may
fall while on its way to pick up the material or towards its final destination;
it may also run out of battery and fail to carry out its action.
In this section we extend the representation and computational models that
we presented in Section 4 to take into account the uncertainty in the agents’
actions. Similarly as in Section 4, we first present a rule-based representation
model for dependencies, based on Possibilistic Multi-Context Systems [35].
We then present the algorithms for computing the alternative coalitions and
for selecting the best coalition under uncertainty using also multiple-criteria
decision making methods.
5.1 Modeling uncertainty
We extend the definition of [60] for dependence relations to take into account
the uncertainty of actions:
Definition 13 The dependency of an agent agi on agent agj to achieve goal
gk, because agj may perform action am needed in plan pl, which achieves the
goal, is denoted as:
dp : poss dep(agi, agj , gk, pl, am, αam)
where αam represents the possibility that agj will carry out action am with
success.
We denote the set of dependencies of agent agi to achieve goal gk through
plan pl = (ag1 : a1, ag2 : a2, . . . , agn : an) as DPposs(agi, gk, pl, αpl), where αpl
represents the aggregated possibility that agents agi, . . . , agn will successfully
perform actions a1, . . . , an, respectively. Assuming that actions a1, . . . , an are
mutually independent:
αpl =
n∏
i=1
αai
In the general case, where dependencies among the actions in pl may exist:
αpl = (
n−1∏
i=1
α[ai|ai+1∧...∧an])× αan
where α[ai|ai+1∧...∧an] denotes the possibility that ai will be carried out suc-
cessfully given that actions ai+1, . . . , an have been successful.
In order to model the uncertainty in the agents’ actions, we model a mul-
tiagent system as a possibilistic MCS (or poss-MCS) with possibilistic bridge
rules that represent the dependencies of the agent on the other agents to
achieve its goals.
Definition 14 For an agent agi with goal gk achieved through plan pl =
(ag1 : a1, ag2 : a2, ..., agn : an), the set of dependencies DPposs(agi, gk, pl, αpl)
is represented as a possibilistic bridge rule of the form:
ci : gk)← (c1 : a1), . . . (cn : an), [αpl ]
where cj , j = 1, ..., i, ..., n is the context representing agent agj .
Based on the above representations, we can now define the following rep-
resentation for multiagents systems with uncertainty.
Definition 15 A poss-MCS M(A) corresponding to a multiagent system A
with uncertainty is a set of possibilistic contexts ci = (Σi, P i, Bi), whereΣi is a
set of atoms representing the goals of the agent and the actions it can perform;
P i represents the local theory of the agent as a possibilistic logic program;
and Bi is a set of possibilistic bridge rules representing the dependencies of
the agent on other agents to achieve its goals.
As it becomes obvious, the above definition is more restrictive compared
to definition 12, as it only allows agents that use possibilistic logic programs.
However, by explicitly representing the degree of certainty in the rules, it offers
a more elaborate manipulation of uncertainty, which is desirable when such
values are available (e.g. in sensor-enriched environments).
Example 7 In our running example, the uncertainty is associated with the
robots carrying the materials to their destinations. In the robotics-related lit-
erature, different approaches may be found to compute uncertainty in (robotic)
motion planning. Typically, uncertainty is considered in two ways: in sensing,
where the current state of the robot and workspace may not be known with cer-
tainty, or in predictability, where the future state of the robot and workspace
cannot be deterministically predicted even when the current state and future
actions are known [40]. Factors that may affect predictability are uncertainty
in the workspace, e.g. moving obstacles [66], uncertainty in the configuration
of the robot [33]; or uncertainty in the robot’s motion [3].
In our running example, the assumption is that uncertainty is associated
with the motion of the robots and the grasping of a material. Furthermore, it
is a function of the distance that the robot has to cover with and without the
material. For our purpose, the following very simple function will suffice to
compute the possibility that robot agi carries out action ajc; namely, carries
material c to its destination:
poss(agi, ajc) = 1− (0.001× dist(agi, j) + 0.002× (dist(j, dest(j)) (18)
where dist(agi, j) denotes the distance between the robot (agi) and the ma-
terial (j), and dist(j, dest(j)) denotes the distance between the material (j)
and its destination (dest(j)). The intuition is that the uncertainty of a robot
carrying a material to its destination is proportional to the distance that the
robot has to cover to get to the material, and the distance that it has to cover
after it grabs the material to deliver it to its destination. As many more things
may go wrong while carrying the material, the second element has a double
weight.
Using this function and the distances between the different locations as
they appear in Table 2, the dependencies among the robots are represented
by the following possibilistic bridge rules:
pr1 = (c1 : g1)← (c1 : a1c), (c2 : a1s), not(c1 : carriesElse1), [0.968]
pr2 = (c4 : g1)← (c4 : a1c), (c2 : a1s), (c1 : a1d), not(c4 : carriesElse1), [0.969]
pr3 = (c2 : g2)← (c2 : a2c), (c1 : a2s), (c3 : a2d), not(c2 : carriesElse2), [0.960]
pr4 = (c1 : g3)← (c1 : a3c), (c4 : a3s), not(c1 : carriesElse3), [0.967]
pr5 = (c3 : g3)← (c3 : a3c), (c4 : a3s), (c1 : a3d), not(c3 : carriesElse3), [0.966]
pr6 = (c3 : g4)← (c3 : a4c), (c2 : a4d), [0.975], not(c3 : carriesElse3),
pr7 = (c4 : g4)← (c4 : a4c), (c3 : a4s), (c2 : a4d), not(c4 : carriesElse4), [0.971]
For example, the necessity degree of rule pr1 is associated with the uncertainty
of action (ag1 : a1c): robot ag1 carrying the pen to desk Da. According to
function 18, the possibility that this action will be carried out with success is:
poss(ag1, a1c) = 1− (0.001× 10 + 0.002× 11) = 0.968
where 10 is the distance between ag1 and the pen, and 11 is the distance
between the pen and desk Da. As in the perfect world case, the negative
atoms in the bridge rules (e.g. not(c1 : carriesElse1)) represent that the
material that a rule refers to (e.g. the pen) is not carried by another robot,
and are derived from bridge rules such as the following:
pr8 = (c1 : carriesElse1)← (c2 : a1c), [1]
pr9 = (c1 : carriesElse1)← (c3 : a1c), [1]
pr10 = (c1 : carriesElse1)← (c4 : a1c), [1]
5.2 Computing coalitions under uncertainty
In Section 2, we showed that the possibilistic equilibrium of a poss-MCS M
is a collection of possibilistic atom sets Si, where each Si is a collection of
possibilistic atoms pi from the system contexts. In the context of multiagent
systems, an equilibrium represents a coalition in which agents can achieve their
goals and pi represents an action or a goal of agent agi and its necessity degree.
In the case of goals the necessity degree represents the level of certainty with
which the coalition will achieve the goal.
To compute the potential coalitions under uncertainty in a multiagent sys-
tem A, one actually has to compute the possibilistic equilibria of M(A). This
is possible using a fixpoint theory proposed in [35], which is based on the
use of a consequence operator that gradually computes the consequences of a
possibilistic MCS using its applicable rules.
Example 8 In our example, the poss-MCS that corresponds to the system of
the four robots, M(A), has two possibilistic equilibria: S0 and S1
S0 =

{(a2s, [1]), (a1d, [1]), (a3d, [1]), (a3c, [0.967]), (g3, [0.967])},
{(a1s, [1]), (a4d, [1]), (a2c, [0.960]), (g2, [0.960])},
{(a4s, [1]), (a2d, [1]), (a4c, [0.975]), (g4, [0.975])},
{(a3s, [1]), (a1c, [0.969]), (g1, [0.969])}

S1 =

{(a2s, [1]), (a1d, [1]), (a3d, [1]), (a1c, [0.968]), (g1, [0.968])},
{(a1s, [1]), (a4d, [1]), (a2c, [0.960]), (g2, [0.960])},
{(a4s, [1]), (a2d, [1]), (a3c, [0.966]), (g3, [0.966])},
{(a3s, [1]), (a4c, [0.971], (g4, [0.971])}

S0 represents coalition C0 and S1 represents coalition C1; the two coalitions
are graphically represented in Figure 3. C0 will achieve goal g1 with certainty
degree 0.969, g2 with 0.96, g3 with 0.967 and g4 with 0.975. On the other hand,
C1 will achieve goal g1 with certainty degree 0.968, g2 with 0.96, g3 with 0.966
and g4 with 0.971.
5.3 Selecting the best coalition under uncertainty
In Section 4.3 we presented different approaches for selecting the best coalition
in the perfect world, where there is certainty about the ability of the agents
to carry out their tasks. If we take into account the uncertainty in the agents’
actions, each coalition can achieve the agents’ goals only with a certain degree
of certainty. This is another criterion that we have to consider when evaluating
the different coalitions.
The problem of selecting a coalition taking into account the degree of
certainty with which the coalitions achieve the different goals is essentially
a multi-attribute decision making (MCDM) problem. We use the following
definition for MCDM problems [70]:
Definition 16 Let D = {Di}, i = 1, . . . ,m be a set of decision alternatives
and R = {Rj}, j = 1, . . . , n a set of decision criteria according to which the
desirability of an action is judged. Determine the optimal decision alternative
D∗ with the highest degree of desirability with respect to all relevant decision
criteria Rj .
In our case, the decision alternatives, D, are the alternative coalitions that
the agents may form, and the criteria, R, are the certainty degrees with which
the four goals will be reached. In the literature one can find many different
alternatives for solving this problem, most of which are based on functions that
aggregate the scores for the different criteria. Some characteristic examples are:
– the Weighted Sum Method [27], according to which each criterion Rj is
given a weight wj , so that the sum of all weights is 1 (
n∑
j=1
wj = 1), and
the overall score of each alternative Di is the weighted sum of qij , i.e. the
scores of Di for each criterion Rj :
WS(Di) =
n∑
j=1
wjqij
The optimal decision alternative is the one with the highest overall score
(WS). This method can only be used in single-dimensional cases, in which
all the score units are the same.
– the Weighted Product Method [45], which aggregates the individual scores
using their product instead of their sum. Specifically, each decision alter-
native is compared with the others by multiplying a number of ratios, one
for each criterion. Each ratio is raised to the power equivalent to the rela-
tive weight of the corresponding criterion. In general, in order to compare
alternatives D1 and D2, the following product has to be calculated:
Ratio(D1/D2) =
n∏
j=1
(q1j/q2j)
wj
where q1j and q2j are the scores of D1 and D2 respectively for criterion
Rj , and wj is the weight of criterion Rj . If the ratio is greater than one,
then D1 is more desirable than D2. The best alternative is the one that is
better, with respect to this ratio, than all other alternatives. This method
is sometimes called dimensionless analysis because its structure eliminates
any units of measure. It can, therefore, be used in both single- and multi-
dimensional decision-making problems.
– TOPSIS (Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution
[19]), which is based on the concept that the chosen alternative should
have the shortest geometric distance from the positive ideal solution and
the longest geometric distance from the negative ideal solution. TOPSIS
assumes that each alternative has a tendency of monotonically increasing
or decreasing utility. Therefore, it is easy to locate the ideal and negative-
ideal solutions.
A review and comparative study of the most prominent methods for multi-
criteria decision making is available in [65].
Computing coalitions in multiagent systems, as this is described in this
paper, is a single-dimension problem, as the different criteria are the certainty
degrees with which the goals are achieved, and are therefore of the same form
and they take values in the same range ([0, 1]). For such cases, the Weighted
Product Method is considered as the preferred method because of its simplicity.
Example 9 In our running example, there are two alternative coalitions with
which the agents can achieve their goals: C0 and C1. If we apply the Weighted
Sum Method, and considering that the four criteria represent the certainty
degrees with which the four goals will be reached (αgi), the weighted sum of
a coalition is:
WS(C) =
4∑
i=1
wgiαgi
where wgi is the weight of goal gi. Assuming that the four goals are equally
important, their weights are equal, therefore the weighted sums of the the
coalitions are:
WS(C0) = 0.25× 0.967 + 0.25× 0.960 + 0.25× 0.975 + 0.25× 0.969 = 0.96775
WS(C1) = 0.25× 0.968 + 0.25× 0.960 + 0.25× 0.966 + 0.25× 0.971 = 0.96625
C0 is preferable as it achieves the system’s goals with greater certainty.
Assuming that goals g1 and g4 (delivering the pen to desk Da and the
cutter to desk Db) are more important that g2 and g3 (delivering the piece of
paper to desk Da and the glue to desk Db), and the weights of the four goals
are: wg1 = wg4 = 0.4 and wg2 = wg3 = 0.1, the weighted sums of the two
coalitions are:
WS(C0) = 0.4× 0.967 + 0.1× 0.960 + 0.1× 0.975 + 0.4× 0.969 = 0.9679
WS(C1) = 0.4× 0.968 + 0.1× 0.960 + 0.1× 0.966 + 0.4× 0.971 = 0.9682
and in this case C1 is considered as the best coalition.
6 Related work
This article does not pretend to be the first work bringing together agents
and context logics. Two earlier studies ([48,50]) used Multi-Context Systems
as a means of specifying and implementing agent architectures. Both studies
propose breaking the logical description of an agent into a set of contexts,
each of which represents a different component of the architecture, and the
interactions between these components are specified by means of bridge rules
between the contexts. The first study [48] followed this approach to simplify
the construction of a BDI agent, while the second [50] extended it to handle
more efficiently implementation issues such as grouping together contexts in
modules, and enabling inter-context synchronization. The main difference with
our approach is that the focus is not on the internal representation of agents,
but rather on their interactions with other agents and the coalitions that they
can form.
As we also mention in the Introduction, this study is built on previous work
on modeling multiagent systems as MCS and computing coalitions using MCS
computational methods and tools, which we first presented in [7]. Here we give
more details about the proposed methodology. We also extend it with model-
ing and reasoning methods from possibilistic reasoning to handle uncertainty
in the agents’ actions. In another previous study, we evaluated information
exchange in distributed information systems, based on modeling MCS as de-
pendence networks where bridge rules are represented as dependencies [15].
Here we do the opposite: we use bridge rules to represent dependencies among
agents, and model agents as contexts in MCS.
Several studies from different research areas have focused on the problem
of coalition formation including variants of the contract net protocol [29,41],
according to which agents break down composite tasks into simpler subtasks
and subcontract subtasks to other agents via a bidding mechanism; formal
approaches from multiagent systems, e.g. [37,55]; solutions from the field of
robotics based on schema theory [64,69] or synergy [43]; approaches inspired
from the formation of coalitions in politics [18]; and adaptive approaches based
on machine learning methodologies [2,61].
Compared to previous approaches, the solution that we propose is the only
one that combines the following four characteristics: (a) it allows agents to
use different knowledge representation models; (b) based on a non-monotonic
reasoning model, it enables representing and reasoning with agents with con-
flicting goals; (c) by integrating features from possibilistic reasoning, it also
allows handling uncertainty in the agents’ actions; and (d) it provides both
centralized and distributed algorithms for computing coalitions, and can hence
be applied in settings with different requirements for information hiding and
sharing, related for example to the privacy and security of the agents.
There is also a number of studies that focus on the problem of forming
coalitions under uncertainty. There are different kinds of uncertainty that they
consider. For example, studies such as [17,56] deal with uncertainty in the
agent type, i.e. in the knowledge about the agent’s abilities and motivations.
Other studies such as [36] focus on the uncertainty in the agents’ costs, e.g.
in a multi-robot system the relevant costs can be energy, hardware cost or
processing time. Finally, the approaches proposed in [62,67] deal with uncer-
tainty in the value of a coalition, i.e. the costs and payoff of a coalition for
each agent taking part in it. Most of the proposed solutions are based on game
theory and machine learning algorithms. Our approach, on the other hand, fo-
cuses on another kind of uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty in the agents’ actions,
and our proposed solution combines elements of logic-based and possibilistic
reasoning.
7 Summary and Future Work
In multiagent systems agents often depend on each other and need to coop-
erate in order to achieve their goals. In this article, we deal with the problem
of computing the alternative coalitions in which the agents may fulfil their
goals. Specifically, we propose a representation of multiagent systems based
on Multi-Context Systems, according to which agents are modeled as con-
texts and dependence relations among agents as bridge rules. Based on this
representation, we compute the equilibria of the MCS, which correspond to
the coalitions in which the agents may fulfil their goals. Then, given a set
of functional and non-functional requirements such as efficiency, stability and
conviviality, we propose ways to select the best coalition. Finally, we extend
our model and algorithms with features from possibilistic reasoning, and more
specifically possibilistic MCS, in order to model, compute and evaluate the
different coalitions taking also into account the uncertainty in the agents’ ac-
tions. We demonstrate the proposed approach using an example from robotics,
in which four different robots need to cooperate in order to perform a given
set of tasks.
In further research, we plan to integrate preferences on agents and goals
into our model. Building on previous work on preference-based inconsistency
resolution in MCS [6,24,25], we will develop algorithms for preference-based
coalition formation in the presence of conflicting goals. We also want to extend
our approach with elements of dynamic MCS [21], i.e. schematic bridge rules
that are instantiated at run time with concrete contexts. This will enable us
to handle changes such as the failure of an agent, the arrival of a new agent or
any change in the operating environment. We will also plan to apply and test
our methods in different kinds of agent-based systems characterized by the
heterogeneity of the participating agents and uncertainty, such as ubiquitous
robots and Ambient Intelligence systems. To achieve this we will use existing
MCS implementations, such as DMCS [5], a distributed solver for MCS, and
MCS-IE [9], a tool for explaining inconsistencies in MCS, and extend them
with features from possibilistic MCS.
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